Empathy is often conceptualised as an emotional or moral disposition, yet a rationalist approach suggests that it is an epistemic necessity rather than a subjective inclination. The intersubjective nature of human experience implies that empathy, rather than being a purely sentimental construct, emerges from the same principles that underpin language, social organization, and knowledge formation. This essay will explore the rationalist basis for empathy by demonstrating that rejecting it leads to synthetic inconsistency and that its necessity arises from the inherent absurdity of reality rather than from moral prescription.
To establish the epistemic necessity of empathy, an understanding of intersubjectivity and synthetic concepts is required. Consider the libertarian notion of “aggression.” At a physical level, an action such as pointing a gun at an individual’s head is not inherently aggressive; however, it is considered as such due to the social consensus that threats constitute harm. The boundary of aggression—whether it begins at the moment of threat, the firing of a bullet, or the displacement of the first atom from a victim’s body—remains indeterminate. The classification of aggression, therefore, is not an objective fact but a collectively agreed-upon heuristic. More broadly, meaning itself is derived from intersubjective agreement rather than independent, objective criteria. This undermines the premise that ethical truths can be derived in isolation, as all synthetic moral constructs require collective recognition to be functional.
If synthetic ethical constructs rely on intersubjectivity, then the rejection of empathy while upholding other intersubjective norms (such as rights, contracts, or personal autonomy) results in synthetic inconsistency. Empathy, in this context, is not merely a virtue but an epistemic mechanism that facilitates comprehension of other perspectives. The recognition of another’s agency, suffering, or intentions presupposes a capacity to engage with their experiences through an intersubjective framework. Thus, from a rationalist perspective, empathy is an indispensable element of knowledge acquisition rather than a mere moral sentiment.
One might argue that even if empathy serves an epistemic function, it does not necessarily entail a moral obligation. Secular humanist responses to absurdity, such as those proposed by Camus, often posit that because existence lacks inherent meaning, one ought to create meaning through ethical action. However, this prescriptive leap is unjustified; there is no inherent necessity to impose meaning onto absurdity. Likewise, deriving ethical imperatives from intersubjectivity risks granting arbitrary moral authority to those who establish their own values upon unclear and inconsistent ethical foundations. Any ethical system that one imposes would necessarily be an intersubjective construct subject to the same limitations and contradictions.
In conclusion, empathy is not an arbitrary moral choice but a rational necessity arising from the structure of intersubjectivity. The rejection of empathy while maintaining other intersubjective norms results in a logical inconsistency. However, acknowledging this necessity does not imply a prescriptive ethical framework, as all synthetic moral systems remain contingent, ambiguous, and ultimately absurd. Empathy, therefore, is best understood not as a moral duty but as an epistemic precondition for navigating a world where meaning is collectively constructed and inherently unstable.
